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Restoration Of Rights To Felons
In California
The restoration of civil rights to persons who have been convicted
of felonies in California is not as complete as it seems.
The loss of rights caused by a felony conviction continues long after
the formal punishment has been served. This was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court when it held that the fact that a defendant's sentence had been served did not render an appeal from a criminal conviction moot.1 The court noted that the adverse "collateral
consequences" that flow from conviction would insure that the convict
which survives
has a "substantial stake in the judgment of conviction
'2
the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him."
The continuing effects of a criminal conviction take the form of loss
of civil rights as well as social prejudices by the public in general. To
the extent that it is not necessary to protect the public, the loss of these
rights may unduly hamper the rehabilitation of ex-convicts as useful
citizens and affect the rate of recidivism.'
There are remedies that remove some of the disabilities that are
legally imposed as a result of felony conviction.4 But these remedies
are not always effective in removing all of the collateral consequences
that flow from conviction.
In examining the rights of felons in California, this comment considers the status of ex-convicts, the present remedies for restoration
of rights, and a proposal to make the present remedies more meaning.
ful.

I.

Tm STATUS OF PERSONS WITH A RECORD OF FELONY CONVICTION

The California Constitution authorizes the loss of certain rights as
a result of a criminal conviction and there are several statutes which
impose restrictions on persons with a record of criminal conviction.
One statute that, as a part of punishment, imposes only temporary re1. Carafas v. LaValley, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); cf. Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 51 (1968).
2. Id.

3. Cal. Assembly Subcomm. on Correctional Facilities, 1960 Report; S. RumIN,
Thn LAW oF CRIuNAL CoaCTXnoN, 612 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RBiNl.].
4. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203.4, 4852.01 et seq.
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strictions on the rights of a person who has been convicted of a felony
is section 2600 of the California Penal Code. This statute provides that
"a sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends
all the civil rights of the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority, or power during such imprisonment."5 After the convicted felon is incarcerated, the California Adult
Authority has discretion to restore to the convict such civil rights as it
may deem proper, except the right to vote, hold public office, act as a
trustee, or give a general power of attorney.6

Certain rights are not taken away by this statute. For example, a
prisoner retains the right to inherit real or personal property 7 and is capable of making a will.8 He can convey real property and is competent
to testify as a witness in a civil or criminal proceeding.9
None of the prisoner's duties, obligations or liabilities are affected by
this statute. 10 He can be prosecuted and sued" although generally
he can not bring a civil suit himself.' 2 He is liable for debts owing on
his existing contracts' 3 although he is not capable of making a new
contract. 4
The effect of this statute continues during parole since the convict is
constructively still a prisoner. 5 Thus a parolee can be the subject of
what would otherwise be an unlawful search and seizure' and a parolee
is incapable of making a contract,' 7 unless the right has been restored to
him by the Adult Authority.
This statute is the last vestige, in California, of the common law concept of civil death by which the legal status of a convict was equal to
that of a naturally dead person.' This statute is punitive in nature rather than for the protection of society, and as such it is narrowly construed to apply only to persons sentenced to imprisonment in state in5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600.
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600. But see CAL. PEN. CODE § 3054 which apparently

permits the Adult Authority to restore to the felon the right to give a general power
of attorney. See Adult Authority Resolution No. 199.
7. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600.

8. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2603.
9. Id.

10. Comment, Convicts-Loss of Civil Rights-Civil Death in California, 26

So. CAL. L. REv. 425, 427 (1953).
11. People v. Lawrence, 140 Cal. App. 2d 133, 135 (1956); People v. Hayes,
9 Cal. App. 2d 157, 160 (1935).
12. Ex parte Maro, 248 P.2d 135, 138 (1952); but state prisoner may bring an
action under the Federal Civil Rights Act, Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963).
13. In re Nerae's Estate, 35 Cal. 392, 396 (1868).
14. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1556.
15. 15 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 53, 54 (1950).
16. People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150 (1964).
17. Rosman v. Cuevas, 176 Cal. App. 2d 867, 869 (1960).
18. CAL. PmN. CODE § 2600; Comment, supra note 10.
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stitutions. 19 And the trend is towards an even more limited application of civil death.20
It should be noted that section 2600 applies to all persons sentenced

to imprisonment. Thus it applies to persons convicted of a felony,
sentenced to prison and actually incarcerated. And it applies to those
persons convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison, but whose sentence was suspended-i.e., those persons that may have been granted
probation without ever having been incarcerated. 21 However, section
2600 would not apply to those persons who are found to be guilty of a
felony but given probation without entry of judgment, although those
persons in this category are still considered to be convicted felons for
purposes of the statutes imposing more permanent restrictions on
rights.22
At any rate, the effects of section 2600 terminate when the felon is
finally discharged from his status as a prisoner and from the control of
the Adult Authority. 23 But restrictions on the right to vote and the
right to hold public office continue because of constitutional and other
statutory provisions."
The California Constitution provides that no person convicted of any
infamous crime and no person convicted of embezzlement or misappropriation of public money shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector.2 5 Prior to the case of Otsuka v. Hite,2" an infamous crime was defined to include any felony.Y1 But Otsuka recognized that some felonies were in no way related to a person's capacity as an elector, and therefore limited the definition of infamous crimes to those crimes involving
moral corruption and dishonesty, thereby branding the persons committing such crimes as a threat to the integrity of the elective process.
This definition of infamous crime is still critized by some since the
determination of which crimes are infamous is made by the officer in
charge of voter registration in each county and thus may vary from
county to county. 8 Also the usual procedure is that persons registering to vote are required to sign a statement indicating that they have
19. Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. 2d 848, 852 (1954); 18 OP. CAL. A'ry GEN.
275 (1951).
20. Comment, supra note 10, at 433.
21. 22 OP. CAL. Ar'y GEN. 39, 40 (1953).
22. Id.
23. Telephone interview, State Dept. of Corrections, Sacramento, Calif., Feb. 9,
1971.
24. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
25. Id.
26. 64 Cal. 2d 596, 599 (1966).
27. In re Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 319 (1914); Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal.
App.2d 736, 738 (1953).
28. Notes and Comments, The Ex-Convict's Right to Vote, 40 So. CAL. L. Rv
148 (1967).

720

1971 / Rights to Felons
not "been convicted of any crime which would disqualify [them] from
voting. 21 9 Since the question itself does not state which crimes are
disqualifying, a person might naturally believe that any crime is disqualifying. If the ex-convict asks, the registrar is under a legal duty
to inform him that not all crimes are disqualifying.3 0 And if an ex-convict is denied the right to vote, he can always appeal to the superior
court of the county for a judicial determination as to whether the crime
committed is in fact infamous." If never sentenced to prison and if
to be infamous, the convicted
the crime convicted of is not considered
32
felon will not lose his right to vote.
The statutes which restrict the right of ex-convicts to hold public office 33 are based on provisions in the California Constitution such as
article 20, section 11, which authorizes legislation to exclude persons
convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office or other
high crimes from holding office, serving on juries, and from the right
to vote.34 One statute that carries out this authority provides that no
person convicted of "malfeasance in office or any felony or other high
crime ' 35 is competent to act as a petit or grand juror.3 ' Another statute provides that conviction of any felony disqualifies a person from
holding office as a peace officer.3 7 A person is also disqualified from
ever holding office if he has committed certain specified crimes such as
perpetrating a fraud on the voting process, bribery, falsification of accounts, embezzlement, and dueling.38 However, if an ex-convict does
not come under one of these special statutes, his right to hold public office is not clear. The Government Code provides that the status of an
elector includes the right to hold public office. 9 Thus it would seem
that, following Otsuka, persons not convicted of infamous crimes and
not coming under one of the special statutes should automatically regain
the right to hold public office upon final release from prison. However, there is no express statutory provision to this effect.
29.

CAL. ELECTIONS CODE

§§ 310, 321; Review of Selected 1970 California

Legislation, 2 PAc. LJ. 275, 470 (1970).
30. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 321.5, 321.7.
31. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 350; 53 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 43 (1970).
32. 22 Op. CAL. ATrY GEN. 39 (1953).
33. Public office has been defined as the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, the tenure of which
is not transient, occasional or incidental, by which for a given period an individual is invested with power to perform a public function for public benefit.
People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 640 (1940).
34. See also CAL. CoNsT. art XII, § 19 and art. XX, § 10.

35. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 199.
36. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 199; CAL.

PEN. CODE

§§ 893, 1072.

37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1029.
38. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 1021; CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 14692; CAL. PEN. CODE

§§ 68, 74, 86, 88.
39. CAL. GOV'T

CODE

§ 274.
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The restoration of the right to act as a fiduciary, as well as the right
to vote and right to hold public office, is specifically excluded from
those rights subject to restoration by the Adult Authority under section
2600 of the Penal Code. It is not clear however whether this right is
automatically restored to an ex-convict. It seems to have been thought
in the past that the right to vote, hold public office, and act as a fiduciary were not automatically restored to ex-convicts. 40 But since the effects of section 2600 terminate after completion of sentence, since there
is no other statutory or constitutional reference to a felon's capacity to
act as a fiduciary 41 and since the advent of Otsuka, it seems reasonable
to conclude that this right is also automatically restored to an ex-convict, at least if the crime for which conviction occurred is not considered to be infamous.
In addition to these disabilities there are other legally imposed disadvantages flowing from a felony conviction. Although all persons
convicted of crimes are competent to testify in both civil and criminal
proceedings, 42 evidence that the person has been convicted of a felony
can be introduced to impeach the credibility of that person.43 The effect of this provision is to discourage an ex-convict from taking the
stand, as a witness or as a party in a civil or subsequent criminal proceeding. Although it has been held unconstitutional in a criminal
proceeding to comment on the failure of a defendant to take the stand
in his own behalf," if he does take the stand to defend himself, his prior
convictions can be used to attack his credibility. 5
The fact of a prior conviction can also be used against an ex-convict in his subsequent conviction of another crime. 40 For example,
there are provisions which increase the punishment for a second offense. 47 Another disability flowing from a felony conviction is that it
is a crime for any person who has been convicted of a felony to own or
possess a concealable firearm." Moreover persons convicted of certain
crimes may be required to register with local law enforcement agencies. 49 While some believe that registration requirements are a means
of harassment and do not prevent or detect crime, 50 statutes require that
40. Kingsley, The Work of the 1943 Legislature-CriminalLaw, 17 So. CAL. L.
REv. 35, 43 (1943).
41. But cf. CAL. PRoB. CoDE § 401 which renders a person convicted of an infamous crime incompetent as an executor.
42. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2603.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

CAL. Evm. CODE § 788; People v. O'Brand, 92 Cal. App. 2d 752, 755 (1949).
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612 (1965); CAL. EVD. CODE § 1101.
CAL. EviD. CoDE § 788.
E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 644, 667, 668, 669.
Id.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 290; CAL. HE.TH & SA aTY CODB § 11850.
RuBIN, at 630.

1971 / Rights to Felons

certain sex offenders 5 and narcotics offenders5 2 register with their local law enforcement agencies. These registration requirements are
based on the belief that such persons are likely to repeat their crimes."I
However, this assumption apparently ends after five years in the case of
the narcotics offenders since their duty to register terminates five years
after final release from prison and parole or probation.54
Furthermore, conviction of a felony may affect a person's employ-

ment in any of the nearly forty businesses and professions which require a license or certificate from the state. 55 Most of the licensing
agencies have statutory authority to revoke or suspend a license if the
licensee is convicted of a felony and/or a crime involving moral turpitude. 56 Conviction of any felony will subject a person to suspension or
57
revocation of license in such businesses as a mineral and oil brokerage,
yacht and ship brokerage, 58 cleaning, dyeing and pressing business, 59 and
the training of guide dogs for the blind. 0 Conviction of any crime involving moral turpitude will subject a person to discipline if he has a
license as, for example, an attorney, 6 a barber, 62 a cosmetologist, 63 or
64
a funeral director and embalmer.
Although it has continually been held that these administrative disciplinary proceedings are not imposing further penalties but rather attempting to select a nonpunitive standard of fitness for the occupation,65 licensing discipline may in fact be unduly punitive when the
crime committed is in no way related to the moral standards of the profession regulated. 6 For example, the conviction of any felony would
not seem to necessarily render a person unfit to run a cleaning, dyeing
and pressing business.
Moral turpitude has been defined as conduct that is "contrary to jus51. C&L. PEN. CODE § 290.
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11850.

53. 2 B.WrKmN, CALIORNIA CRIMES, § 966 (1963).
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11853.
55. Booth, Restoration of Rights, CONTNUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIF.

CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 11, 641-647 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BOOTH,C.E.B.].
56. 28 out of 39.
57. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10562(b).
58. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8955(b).
59. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9540.3(d).
60. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7211.9(d).
61.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6101.

62. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6576.
63. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7431(j).
64. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7691, 7708.
65. Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 116 (1966); In re Phillips, 17
Cal. 2d 55, 132 A.L.R. 644 (1941). But see Sautter v. Contractors Board, 124 Cal.
App. 2d 149 (1954).
66. Notes and Recent Decisions, 44 CAL. L. REv. 403 (1956); Note, Entrance and
Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. REV.
533, 541 (1962); and compare, Otsuka, 64 Cal. 2d 596, noting that some crimes are
in no way related to voting process.
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tice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. ' 67

Most licensing agencies
consider conviction of a felony to be prima facie evidence of moral turpitude without further inquiry into the relation of the crime to the business or profession regulated."' Some of the licensing agencies, however, only provide for discipline when the crime committed is one arising out of or related to the particular profession.6 9 Examples of such

agencies are those regulating accountants,"0 architects,
ers7 2 and contractors." 3

1

insurance brok-

In addition to disciplining persons who already are licensed, these
agencies are authorized to deny a license to applicants who do not
possess good moral character.7 4 Since good moral character is generally defined "in terms of an absence of proven conduct or acts which
have been historically considered as manifestations of 'moral turpitude,' ,,75 a record of conviction of a felony is generally considered to
be evidence of bad moral character. 76 The determination of whether
or not a license will be granted is made in each case by the particular
licensing boards, which indicate that they consider each case individually, considering all of the surrounding circumstances. 77 It is clear,
however, that an ex-convict applying for any license will be subjected
to special and thorough scrutiny before he is granted a license or granted
reinstatement of his license and it has been held reasonable to deny a
license or deny reinstatement for lack of good character on the basis of
a prior felony conviction alone.78
Generally, in practice, whenever an applicant has a record of felony
conviction, the agency may do one of two things. It may deny the license, giving the applicant a certain number of days within which to reply. If the applicant replies within the given time, he is entitled to an
administrative hearing before the particular board. Or the agency may
request the applicant to appear for an administrative hearing before the
67. In re McAllister, 14 Cal. 2d 602, 603 (1939); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147,

150 (1937).

68. Telephone interviews: Board of Barber Examiners, Board of Accountants,
Funeral Directors & Embalmers Board, Chiropractic Board, Pharmacy Board, Dry
Cleaners Board, Cosmetology Board, Optometry Board, Board of Registration for
Professional Engineers; Sacramento, Calif., March, 1971.
69. Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in
California, 14 STAN. L. REV. 533, 547 (1962).
70. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5100(a), (b), (i).
71. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5577.
72. CAL. INS. CODE H9 1688(m), 1669(a), (b).
73. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7123.
74. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE H9 1000-5 (chiropractors), 1628 (dentists),
2866, 2877 (vocational nurses-applicant shall have committed no act that would be
grounds for discipline; conviction of felony or crime involving moral turpitude is
grounds for discipline), 6545 (barbers).
75. Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452 (1966).
76. See note 69 supra at 533; Telephone interviews, supra note 68.
77. Telephone interviews, supra note 68.
78. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2d 313 (1956);
22 A.L.R.2d 255 (1952).
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agency makes its decision on whether to accept or deny the application.
In either instance, the burden of showing good moral character is on the
applicant. 79
When a licensee is convicted of a felony and the licensing agency intends to suspend or revoke the license, the licensee is also entitled to
an administrative hearing. In this case, however,80 the burden of showing a lack of good moral character is on the board.
Any decision of these administrative hearings is subject to judicial review. But since these administrative boards are given wide discretion,
the applicant has the burden of showing that the board's findings were
not supported by the evidence in order to obtain a reversal of an adverse
decision."'
State civil service employment may also be denied8 2 or terminated"
for conviction of a felony, although it is maintained that a non-discriminatory practice of examining all the surrounding circumstances, including the relation of the crime to the particular position, is used.84 The
actual practice is almost identical to the practices of licensing agencies,
with the State Personnel Board performing the administrative duties.
As the state, through its agencies, continues to question an ex-convict's credibility and character after his formal punishment has ended,
public opinion also adds to the effects of having been convicted of a
felony. The most harmful effect in terms of rehabilitation of ex-convicts is discrimination in private employment.85 Although there seem
to be no meaningful studies measuring the actual amount of discrimination practiced by private employers towards ex-convicts, it is generally
agreed that many employers are reluctant to hire such persons. 86 However, the Employment Office of the State Department of Human Resources Development has adopted a positive policy of encouraging em79. Telephone interviews, supra note 68; e.g., Rule 10, Sec. 101, following CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (attorneys); Hallman v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 65
Cal. 2d 447 (1966); Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 117 (1966).
80. Telephone interviews, supra note 68.
81. Hallinan, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 450; In re Aklow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 840 (1966).
82. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 18935(f).
83. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 19572(k).
84. Personal interview with State Personnel Board, Sacramento, Calif., Jan. 18,
1971; memorandum to all state agencies on policy and practice in the evaluation of
arrest and conviction records of applicants for State employment, April 21, 1967.
85. "That regular employment is a basis for successful living for the former
offender, just as it is for the person who has never violated the law, is axiomatic."
Randolph E. Wise, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal Record, 6 NPPA
JOURNAL,

No. 2, April, 1960.

86. The Sacramento Bee, 3-part series on the saga of a parolee, Jan. 11, 1971,
Sec. B, p. 1; Jan. 18, 1971, Sec. B, p. 1; Jan. 25, 1971, Sec. B, p. 1. Personal interview
with an ex-convict, Sacramento, Calif., Jan. 24, 1971; Personal interview at 7th Step
Foundation, Sacramento, Calif., Jan. 13, 1971; 3 CAL. W=ST. L. REV. 121, 124 (1967);
RuDIN, at 639.
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ployers to hire ex-convicts. 87 8 The efforts of this office have met with
varying but increasing success.
Reluctance of employers to hire ex-convicts may sometimes be based
on the policies of bonding companies in insuring employers against
losses caused by employees. A typical employee bond will automatically exclude persons with any kind of criminal record from coverage
under the blanket bonds.89 But a bonding company may still bond an
ex-convict for employment on an individual basis if they can be reasonably certain that the bond will be safeY0 This need not be a problem
any longer, however, since the State Department of Human Resources
Development will provide a $10,000 employment bond on any ex-convict.91 This $10,000 bond can be used by any ex-convict who has secured employment either on his own or through the State Employment
Office and regardless of whether it is state employment or private employment.
II.

PRESENT REMEDIES FOR RESTORATION OF RIGHTS

For the convicted felon who has proven himself to no longer be a
criminal threat to society, the California Legislature has seen fit to provide three types of remedies to restore him as much as possible to his
former position.
DISmissAL OF CONVICTION

The first remedy is a dismissal of conviction. If a person has been
convicted of a felony92 and is granted probation, after successful completion of probation, the convict can petition the court for expungemerit of his record of conviction. 3 This applies whether probation is
granted without entry of judgment or probation is granted after the
prison sentence is suspended.'
The purpose of granting probation is to assist in rehabilitation."
87. Telephone interview, Employment Office, State Dept. of Human Resources
Development, Sacramento, Calif., Feb. 9, 1971.
88. Id.: Some employers are strictly opposed to hiring ex-convicts. Those that
are more flexible often find that ex-convicts make better than average employees since
an ex-convict will realize he has more at stake than usual. However, favorable employer attitudes are often found only for unskilled positions with little or no responsibility.
89. Telephone interview, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Sacramento, Calif.,
Feb. 9, 1971.
90. Id.
91. Telephone interview, Employment Office, State Dept. of Human Resources
Development, supra.
92. This remedy has been extended to apply to misdemeanants as well. CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1203.4a.
93. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4.
94. See 22 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 39 (1953).
95. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203; People v. Johnson, 134 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143
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Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code, the provision for dismissal of conviction upon successful completion of probation, was first enacted as
part of the statutory scheme setting up probation as a method of assisting rehabilitation.9 Cases have stated that the purpose of section
1203.4 is to relieve from further punishment, and restore rights to, one
whose probation has resulted in his reformation and to effect complete
97
rehabilitation.
The procedure for obtaining a dismissal of conviction is relatively
simple. Upon successfully completing his probation, the probationer
may petition the court to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or to set aside the verdict of guilty if he pleaded not guilty, and

have the accusation or information dismissed. 98 If the court finds any
violations of probation, whether or not the probationer was previously
charged with them, dismissal can be denied. 99 Otherwise, the language
of the statute is mandatory, and the court cannot deny the petition of a
person who meets the requirements on the ground that he failed to reform.100 Then, in the words of the statute, he "shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or
crime of which he has been convicted."''1 1
The actual effect of a dismissal is not so complete as it might appear. 10 2 Although an early interpretation of section 1203.4103 indicated that its effect was to legally wipe out the fact of conviction and in
spite of the alleged purpose to effect complete rehabilitation, the legislature and the courts have been unwilling to grant such a full and complete expungement. The courts have interpreted "expunged" to mean
only that it will be noted on the record of conviction that the charges
10 5
have been dismissed.' 04 Since the record of conviction still stands,
the ex-convict must still admit his prior conviction whenever such inquiries are made in employment applications, license applications or
in any other connection. He may also indicate, of course, that the
charges have been dismissed. However, the felon's right to vote will be
(1955); People v. Cortez, 199 Cal. App. 2d 839, 844 (1962); Comment, Penal RehabilitationBenefits Curtailed? 2 STAN. L. REv. 221, 222 (1949).
96. Enacted as CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203, CAL. STATS. 1909, c.232, p.357.

97. People v. Mojado, 22 Cal. App. 2d 323, 325 (1937); People v. Taylor, 178

Cal. App. 2d 472, 478 (1960).

98. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4.

99. People v. Turner, 193 Cal. App. 2d 243, 246 (1961).

100. People v. Johnson, 134 Cal. App. 2d 140, 144 (1955).
101. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4.
102. Booth, Expungement Myth, 38 L.A. BAR BULL. 161 (1963); Zwerin, Section
1203.4 Penal Code, 36 CAL. S.B.J. 94 (1961).
103. People v. Mackey, 58 Cal. App. 123, 130 (1922).
104. 36 Op. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 1 (1960); Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile
Record, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 816, 819 (1965).
105. Id.
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restored by a dismissal. 10° A dismissal will prevent use of the conviction to impeach the convict's credibility as a witness, unless he is
testifying in a criminal action on his own behalf, in which case evidence
of the prior conviction can still be used against him.' 0 7 Furthermore,
dismissal does not prevent use of the conviction in a subsequent prosecution for sentencing purposes.' 08 A dismissal will terminate registration requirements of sex offenders' and narcotics offenders 10 unless
the defendant has been adjudged to be a mentally disordered sex of-

fender in a civil proceeding."'

But a dismissal does not relieve a

felon from the criminal sanctions against his owning or possessing a
concealable weapon.' 12
More importantly, however, a dismissal of conviction has no effect
at all on the licensing by administrative agencies. There is no automatic reinstatement of any license; nor are any of the licensing agencies
bound by the fact of dismissal when revoking, suspending or denying a
license on the basis of a criminal conviction." 3
The first case to indicate this fact was In re Phillips,"4 which involved an attorney who was given probation for a crime of moral turpitude and whose conviction was subsequently dismissed under section
1203.4 proceedings. The court held that dismissal of the conviction
would not prevent disbarment because discipline of attorneys is peculiarly within the province of the courts and thus not subject to legislation.115
Phillips was followed by Meyer v. Board of Medical Examinersn"
which upheld the suspension of a medical license for a felony conviction.
The Meyer court relied on, and reached the same result as in, the Phillips
decision. But in the process, it established the now accepted doctrine
of a license is not a "penalty"
that the denial, suspension or revocation
17
1203.4.
section
of
meaning
the
within
Thus, it has been reasoned that it would unduly hamper the discretion of licensing boards if they were bound to recognize statutory rehabilitation and that the felon must make a positive showing of re106. Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 745 (1963).
107. CAL. EviD. CODE § 788; People v. O'Brand, 92 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756 (1949).

108. People v. Hainline, 219 Cal. 532, 534, 535 (1933); People v. Walters, 190
Cal. App. 2d 98, 100 (1961).
109. CAL. PEN. CODE § 290; Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 45
(1958).
110. CAL. HEALTh & SAFETY CODE § 11853.
111. 52 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 118 (1969); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6302.
112. CAL. PEN. CODE 9H 1203.4, 12021.
113. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2765.
114. 17 Cal. 2d 55 (1941).
115. Id.
116. 34 Cal. 2d 62 (1949).
117. Id.
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habilitation."'

Although an offender was trusted with probation and

subsequently proved himself to be worthy of such trust,
the law will not permit the dismissal of the proceeding in the criminal case to automatically restore or terminate the suspension of the
license. With this classification [the regulation of certain professions through the issuance of license] the requirement of rehabilitation is not the statutory rehabilitation provided by Section
1203.4 of the Penal Code. An affirmative showing must be made
by the applicant to the satisfaction of the licensing authority before
he may be restored to his former position as a licensee. 119
Virtually all of the licensing statutes referred to above have been
amended to specifically exclude the effect of section 1203.4, based on
the rule laid down in Meyer. A representative statute is as follows:
A plea or verdict of guilty or a conviction following a plea of
nolo contendere made to a charge of a felony or any offense involving moral turpitude is deemed to be a conviction within the
meaning of this article. The board may order the license suspended or revoked, or may decline to issue a license, when the
time for appeal has elapsed or the judgment of conviction has been
affirmed on appeal or when an order granting probation is made
suspending the imposition of sentence, irrespective of a subsequent
order under the provisions of Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code allowing such a person to withdraw his plea of not guilty, or setting
aside the verdict of guilty, or dismiss the accusation, information

or indictment.'

21

The law is not clear on the effect of dismissal on a convict's right to
hold public office 12 1 or a fiduciary position. Since a dismissal restores

the right to vote 2 2 and since the privileges of an elector include the
right to hold public office, 2 3 assuming that the right to vote can be
equated to the right to be an elector, it could be argued that a dismissal
also restores the right to hold public office. And since disqualification
from holding public office is characterized as a penalty, 2 4 the argument would be that such penalty should be removed upon dismissal of
conviction under section 1203.4. Furthermore, since statutes such as
section 2600 treat the right to hold public office and the right to hold a
position of trust the same as the right to vote, it would seem that the
118. Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 872 (1959). See also, Ready v.
Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113; Copeland v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev., 241 Cal. App. 2d
186 (1966); 22 A.L.R. 255 (1923).
119. 51 Cal. 2d at 872.
120. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2765 (nurses).
121. Booth, C.E.B., at 636.
122. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
123. CA.. Gov'r CODE § 274.
124. 2 B. WxIN, CALiuu~ CRU4Es, § 965 (1963).
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dismissal should restore all three of these rights in the same way as it
restores the right to vote. This conclusion would also be in keeping
with the rehabilitative purpose of section 1203.4.
Thus, the dismissal of conviction is not without its shortcomings as a
remedy for restoring the rehabilitated ex-convict to his prior position. 20
The only benefits that the dismissal actually provides are the restoration of the right to vote to those who do not already possess it, a partial restoration of the offender's credibility as a witness, and a release
from registration requirements for all those who have not been adjudged mentally disordered sex offenders. While important benefits,
these items are probably not as vital to the readjustment of the convict
as employment in the occupation of his choice would be.
The force of this statute as a remedy was removed12 when Meyer
established that a dismissal had no effect on the discretion of licensing
agencies. 127 Thus, in spite of statutory rehabilitation, the assumption
that a person once convicted of a felony is still a person of bad character
is allowed to continue for licensing purposes. 128
So long as the record of conviction exists, the informal disabilities that
are based on social prejudices will continue.2 9 Private employers generally do not understand the significance of a dismissal of conviction,
and, even if they do, they are justified in following the example of
the licensing agencies in ignoring its significance.
PAWONS
A.

PardonsBased on a Certificateof Rehabilitation

The second type of remedy, available to a felon who has spent time
in a state penal institution in California 30 and who can prove he is re1 Any perhabilitated, is a rehabilitative pardon from the Governor. '3
son who has been convicted of a felony and who has been released from
a state prison or other state penal institution may apply for a certificate
of rehabilitation from the superior court of the county in which he resides and a full pardon from the Governor.'8 2 If granted, the pardon
125. The available remedy-usually dismissal or a pardon based on a certificate
of rehabilitation-is frequently ineffective in removing the disability or restoring the right or privilege that concerns the client.
Booth, C.E.B. at 628.
126. Comment, Penal Rehabilitation Benefits Curtailed? 2 STN. L. Rnv. 221
(1941).
127. See also, 51 Cal. 2d at 872.
128. Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 117 (1966).
129. Booth, C.E.B. at 622; Comment, 3 CAL.W.Esr. L. lv. 121 (1967).
130. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.01.
131. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
132. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.01 et seq.
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restores all civil and political rights of citizenship. 133
The provisions for a rehabilitative pardon were originally enacted in

1943 to provide a uniform and objective standard whereby all persons
who desired to have their records clear could do so without
having to
34
rely on the subjective standards of the Governor's staff.The procedure for obtaining a pardon based on a certificate of re-

habilitation is far more complicated than the procedure for obtaining a
dismissal of conviction after probation. 1 35 There is a required period
of rehabilitation after release from prison during which the felon must
reside in the state under supervision of the local law enforcement officer before he is eligible to apply for this remedy. The felon must first
file with the county clerk in the county of his residence a notice of intention to apply for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. 13 This
notice begins the period of rehabilitation. The notice can be filed while
the felon is still on parole, but the felon must be off parole before applying for a certificate of rehabilitation. 3 7 Petitioner must agree to
supervision and submit to any reasonable conditions imposed by the
local law enforcement officer-either the chief of police or the county
sheriff. 138 However, the supervision often is in name only and then
39
only perfunctory.
The period of rehabilitation which begins when the notice of intention is filed requires at least three years residence within the state, plus
thirty days for each year of the maximum sentence imposed for the
crime of which the petitioner was convicted. 40 Life sentence is considered to be fifty years for this purpose.' 4 ' It should be noted that for
rehabilitation purposes, it would probably be more logical to measure
the thirty day requirement by the actual sentence served rather than the
present policy of measuring by the maximum sentence imposed.

During this period of rehabilitation, the petitioner must live "an
honest and upright life, shall conduct himself with sobriety and industry, shall exhibit good moral character, and shall conform to and
obey the laws of the land."' 42 After expiration of this time, petitioner
133.

CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.17.

134. Telephone interview, Richard A. McGee, President of the American Justice
Institute and former Director of the Dep't of Corrections, appointed by Governor
Warren, Sacramento, California, April 2, 1971.
135. See Milligan, Certificate of Rehabilitation and Application for Pardon in
California,43 CAL. S.B.J. 112 (1968).
136. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.01.

137. 8 Op. CAL. A-r'y GEN. 113, 115 (1946).

138.
139.
140.
141.

CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.02.
Personal interview, Dep't of Corrections, Sacramento, California, March, 1971.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.03.
id.

142. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.05.
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may file in the superior court of the county in which he resides a petition for ascertainment and a declaration of the fact of his rehabilitation. 148 Notice of this hearing is sent to the district attorney, the chief
of police, the county sheriff, the district attorney of each county in
which the petitioner was convicted of a felony, and the office of the
Governor.' 44 The court can require production of all reports and records it deems necessary. 45

No filing fees or court costs146 or attorney

fees 4 '

are to be charged. The district attorney is required to make an
investigation of the petitioner and report the results to the court.148
If the court then finds the petitioner rehabilitated and presently a
person of good moral character, it will so declare and this declaration is
a certificate of rehabilitation.' 149 The declaration is then sent to the
Governor and constitutes an application for a pardon. 150 If the Governor concurs, which he usually does,' 5 ' a pardon will be granted. If
the petitioner has been convicted of more than one felony, the California Supreme Court must also concur before the Governor grants a
pardon.
B.

1 52

Direct Pardons

The direct pardon should be distinguished from a pardon based on
a certificate of rehabilitation. A convict can at any time make direct
application to the Governor for a pardon.'" 3 The application is routinely referred to the Adult Authority for their review and recommendations in accordance with their advisory responsibilities. ' 4 Direct pardons are granted for innocence or for rehabilitation. 5 ' A pardon based on innocence allows the person to be indemnified for having
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

148.

CAL. PEN. CODE §
CAL. PEN. CODE §
CAL. PEN. CODE §
CAL. PEN. CODE §
CAL. PEN. CODE §
CAL. PEN. CODE

4852.06.

4852.07.
4852.1.
4852.09.
4852.2.

§ 4852.12.

149. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.13.
150. Kingsley, The Work of the 1943 California Legislature: Criminal Law, 17
So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 44 (1943).
151. Telephone interview with Governor's Office, Sacramento, Calif., Feb. 10, 1971:
The Governor generally approves, unless in the time lapse between the judicial declaration and the executive review, there have been arrests. Then the applicant is allowed
to reapply later. A total of 21 rehabilitative pardons and 6 direct pardons were
granted by the Governor in 1970. Report from the Governor, Acts of Executive
Clemency of California, 1970.
152. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.16.
153. CAL. CoNsT. art V, § 8; CAL. PEN. CODE § 4800 et seq.
154. Booth, C.E.B. at 625; Kingsley, Work of the 1937 Legislature: Criminal
Law, 11 So. CAL. L. Rav. 62, 85 (1937); Meese and McInerny, Executive Clemency,
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIF. CEImINAL Lvw PRAcTICE II, at 705-708
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Meese & MoInerny, C.E.B.].
155. Meese & MclInerny, C.E.B. at 698.
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been wrongfully convicted, and his conviction cannot be used against
156
him in any way.
Direct pardons based on rehabilitation generally are not granted unless the applicant is not eligible to apply for a pardon based on a certificate or rehabilitation, and, when granted, often require a showing simi-

lar to, and often for an even longer time than, that required for a certificate of rehabilitation. 5" 7 It has been said that a pardon of this type
"blots out guilt and allows the person to be born anew."' 58 This has
not been shown to be an accurate statement.' 9 In practice, the effect
of this type of pardon is identical to that of a pardon based on a certificate of rehabilitation.'
C. Effect of Pardons
Although both a court and the Governor concur that the ex-convict
is rehabilitated based on a minimum three years plus the thirty day requirement, the actual effect of a pardon based on a certificate of rehabilitation is much like that of a dismissal of conviction. As with a
dismissal the fact of conviction still stands and the convict must still adBut unmit, when asked, that he has been convicted of a crime.'
like the dismissal, the pardon clearly restores all rights of citizenship, in
cluding the right to hold public office and hold a position of trust as well
as the right to vote.'0 2
The ex-convict's credibility as a witness is now totally restored. The
fact of the prior conviction can not be used to impeach his credibility
even if testifying on his own behalf in a subsequent prosecution.'0 5 But
the fact of the prior conviction can still be used for sentencing purposes
if subsequently convicted of another crime. 164 The ex-convict is still
not allowed to own or possess a concealable firearm. However the
Governor has discretion to restore this right if he so desires, unless the
crime convicted of was one involving the use of a dangerous weapon, in
which case the ex-convict has forfeited this right. 65 Registration require156. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 3045, 4900 et seq.; 28 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 178, 182
(1956).
157. Meese and McInerny, C.E.B., at 705-708.
158. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1866); People v. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439,
442 (1872).
159.
160.
161.
162.
provided

People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 511 (1937); 43 CAL. S.BJ. 112 (1968).
Meese & Mclnerny, C.E.B., at 708.
9 Cal. 2d at 512.
1945 amendment to CAL. PEN. CODE § 4822.15 deleted the sentence which
that the right to hold public office and the right to act as a trustee were not

restored by a certificate of rehabilitation.
163. CAL. Evln. CODE § 788.
164. 9 Cal. 2d at 513.

165.

CAL. PEN. CODE

§§ 12021, 4854.
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ments for sex and narcotics offenders are likewise terminated.' 01 However, reinstatement to practice a licensed profession is not automatic and
07
the fact of conviction still remains as a basis for denial of a license.1
The statutory effect of a full pardon is to restore to the convict "all
the rights, privileges and franchises of which he has been deprived in
consequence of said conviction," with special exception that it shall not
interfere with the authority of the Board of Medical Examiners.'
The
pardon based on a certificate of rehabilitation is further restricted,
however, by the provision that it does not require the reinstatement of
the right or privilege to practice or carry on any profession or occupation
which requires a license and that it shall not interfere with the authority
of the Board of Medical Examiners, any licensing agency which licenses
persons to apply their art or profession on the person of another, or the
State Bar of California. 1 69 Thus, although the person who once committed a crime has since shown good moral character for a minimum of
three years plus the thirty day requirement, his character can still be
questioned by licensing agencies on the basis of his prior conviction
alone.

170

It can be seen then that a rehabilitative pardon also has its shortcomings as a remedy for restoring the former felon to an equal position
in society. As a practical matter, many ex-convicts never take advantage of this remedy for various reasons. Many are reluctant to submit to the extra supervision for such a long period of time. 71 They
must reside in the state during the entire period. Also there is a general belief among many ex-convicts that it would be impossible to actually get a pardon, and thus they are discouraged from trying.' 72 So
long as the record of conviction exists and must be admitted to, the informal disabilities from conviction will continue.17
And the conviction can still be relied upon by licensing agencies as evidence of bad
7
moral character.1 1
The existence of the present remedies indicates the increased social
awareness relating to ex-convicts. But they are not complete in effecting
their purpose. Most would agree that to complete rehabilitation, indi166. CAL. PEN. CODE § 290.5.
167. Feinstein v. State Bar of Calif., 39 Cal. 2d 541, 547 (1952);
2 Cal. 2d 324 (1935). But see In re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121
WITIN, CALIFoRNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys, § 95 (2d ed. 1970); 22
(1922).
168. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4853.
169. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.15.
170. See Note, The Effect of a Pardon on License Revocation
ment, 15 HAST. L.J. 355 (1964).

In re Lavine,
(1915); 1 B.

A.L.R.2d 255

and Reinstate-

171. Booth, C.E.B. at 629.
172. Personal interview, 7th Step Foundation, Sacramento, Calif., Jan. 13, 1971.
173.

See note 104 supra.

174. See notes 140-142 supra.
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vidual rights must be restored to the ex-convict except when the interest
75
of protecting the public is overriding.1
California has indicated that its policy relating to convicts is primarily rehabilitation.176 And it has gone so far as to provide procedures whereby an ex-convict can prove that he is rehabilitated.
However, even after finding the ex-convict to be rehabilitated, the state
continues to treat the ex-convict as a threat to society through its laws
that provide that statutory rehabilitation is not sufficient for purposes
of licensing agencies that require good moral character.
It is to the best interest of everyone that ex-convicts are provided with
incentive to rehabilitate themselves and pursue the occupation of their
choice. Yet the continual requirement of an extra showing of proof
of good character may frustrate rehabilitation and prevent the most efficient use of the person's talents.
Although the informal disabilities resulting from conviction are
primarily based on social prejudices, it is submitted that they could be
reduced if the state set the example by treating the person who is rehabilitated by statute as in fact rehabilitated.
IH.

PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF EX-CONVICTS

A legislative proposal to complete the state's policy regarding rehabilitation, to provide incentive to ex-convicts to rehabilitate themselves, and to insure a second chance to those convicts who have rehabilitated themselves would be the following:
A license shall not be denied on the sole basis of a prior conviction of a felony not directly related to the occupation for which
license is sought when:
1. The conviction has been set aside by dismissal proceedings,
or
2. A pardon or certificate of rehabilitation has been granted.
The effect of this proposal would be to create a legal presumption
of rehabilitation once a person has obtained either a dismissal of conviction, a certificate of rehabilitation or a direct pardon.
A licensing agency should not be able to find bad character and
thus deny a license on the basis of a prior conviction alone if the convict has proved himself to be rehabilitated. A dismissal of conviction
is not granted unless the convict was trusted with probation and subsequently proved himself to be worthy of such trust. And a certificate of
rehabilitation is even more proof of good character because it indicates
175. RuBIN, at 622, 638-44; Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights of
Offenders, NPPA YEmaoox, 1952, at 88.
176. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 687 (1960).
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a minimum of three years plus the thirty day requirement of supervised
good conduct. There is no minimum time required for a direct pardon,
though in fact a much longer period of time is usually involved. In
these instances, the burden of proof should be shifted to the licensing
agency to show that the applicant is not of good character and if so,
why he is not fit for the particular occupation. If the licensing agency
fails to carry this burden, the applicant should be granted relief by a
court of law on the grounds of abuse of discretion by the concerned licensing board.
If the prior conviction is directly related to the occupation, there may
be a reason for a stricter policy. Examples of such situations are the
laws in existence now which absolutely bar a prior sex offender from
being a teacher' 7 and bar a prior embezzler from being an accountant. 178 In these instances when there is a direct relationship between the crime committed and the occupation, the public interest
should prevail. Furthermore, a positive policy such as this on the
part of the state may indirectly improve the attitude of private employers
and bonding companies.
Those ex-convicts that are in fact rehabilitated should be assured
of a second chance and all ex-convicts should be provided with incentive to rehabilitate themselves.
Thus it is clear that the effects of criminal conviction remain long
after formal punishment has been completed. To the extent that
these continuing effects do not serve a legitimate public interest, they
must be removed in the interest of the individual.
California has stated that its policy with respect to ex-convicts
is primarily rehabilitation, and has gone so far as to provide detailed procedures for ex-convicts to prove they are rehabilitated. Yet the

stigma of the prior conviction is never removed as society continues to
take its last ounce of flesh.

A proposal to truly wipe out the legal effects of a prior conviction,
as far as licensing is concerned, for the man that has proved himself to
be rehabilitated would allow us to complete our policy of rehabilitation.
Gail Ohanesian

177. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13130.
178. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5100(b).
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